Hello and welcome to Imagine an Apple, the podcast about our inner mental worlds. My name is Francis and today our guest is Mike Johnson.
Hi everyone.
Also with me is Vin, my co-host. Hello Vin.
Hey Francis. Hi Mike. So Mike is, uh, formerly worked at the Qualia Institute but now is currently doing other stuff.
But today we will be interviewing Mike about his internal experiences, specifically about the stuff that he specializes in.
Tanha, qualia, and active influence among some of the things we'll be talking about.
So
So what we're interested in talking about today is inner experiences and how you've
might experience some of these, um, phenomenal, uh, your phenomenology, whether it's more visual or auditory or, or, um, olfactory.
And I was wondering if you have, um, special kinds of phenomenology that you think are uncommon in the general population.
Hmm. Thanks. That's a, that's a really good question.
Um, so I would open with, uh, you know, no one exactly knows how common or uncommon their phenomenology is.
but we can sort of analyze base
base rates and different sort of physiologies. And yeah, I was actually talking about this with
a friend today. And I was saying, well, I think that I have a somewhat unusual
phenomenology. And they were saying, okay, cool, Mike, why do you think that? What makes you say
that? And I actually wrote a decently long article about something very similar. It's called
autism as a disorder of dimensionality. And it basically makes the case that people vary in a
very interesting way. So part of physiology is understanding dimensions of natural variation.
And kind of the interest,
give rise to interesting personality types, or in this sense, interesting phenomenologies.
And my thesis in that piece was that people vary in terms of literally how many neurons they have
in a unit volume of brain mass. And this is based on some research, some autopsies of
children with autism.
And basically, that, and this is actually a pretty crazy, crazy result. They did autopsies
and found that autistic children had on average, 67 more, 67% more neurons in the same volume of
prefrontal cortex, which is a lot. It's not just 1% or 10%. It's 67% more.
Um, so that got me,
I'm sort of thinking about, okay, well, what does that mean? And can we sort of derive
interesting things from this sort of one factor model? And my thesis was that, yes, we can.
And I guess I'd sort of frame that as, if you, if you take a, so everyone's kind of familiar with
how LLMs work, at least a little bit these days. And, and sort of the, the challenges of,
if you sort of, if you sort of, if you sort of, if you sort of, if you sort of, if you sort of,
sort of have a certain number of parameters in your LLM, then you have certain alignment
challenges. Certain things work to align the LLM and certain things maybe don't work as well.
And in this case, basically you'd be jacking the parameter count by 67%. And so you get into
a different kind of, different kinds of failure mode. And I promise this is answering your
question. Yeah. So the observation that I made in the piece was that the natural sort of circuitry
that evolution gives us sort of has pre-built optimization into it. That this is a
very finely tuned evolved circuit that produces a specific result. But basically if you make
these networks thicker, if you take an optimized circuit, I don't know if you're familiar with
in computing, there are ASICs,
application-specific integrated circuits, basically a custom chip for a custom task. And it does one thing, but it does this one thing really well, so like a Bitcoin miner.
And then you have FPGAs, field programmable gate arrays, that basically, it can be anything. This is a chip that you can reprogram at the hardware level.
You can make it look like any other chip, or you can sort of solve any problem with hardware, but you actually have to do the programming.
And so, if this sort of autists have more thicker networks, we can say, more neurons and more connections between neurons,
then their circuits are more like an FPGA than an ASIC.
More like a general unoptimized circuit.
More like a generalized network than sort of a sleek, highly tuned, thin network.
Right.
So, yeah.
So, in this, so I'll pause a little bit. Does that all make sense?
So, I'm a little bit lost at the moment.
I'm not entirely sure what an ASIC is, or the other thing that you mentioned, an FPG.
And not entirely sure how emotion, how this relates to emotions and qualia.
So, expand a little bit more what you mean by like dimensionality.
What does that mean for autistic brains to have different dimensionality?
Yeah, yeah, you bet.
So, the, so an ASIC is a specialized chip.
It's very optimized.
And an FPGA is a much more generalized chip.
It's not optimized.
But you can program it yourself.
And the sense is that if a brain has sort of extra neurons in it,
it's more like an FPGA than an ASIC.
It has a lot of potential in it.
But it's not particularly optimized.
Right.
But what is it optimized to do?
Yeah, yeah.
So, we generally, like a lot of circuits are pretty optimized in the brain.
Like we have circuits to detect faces.
We have circuits to detect noises and scary noises.
We have circuits to figure out which foods are tasty and which are not.
And the, the ASIC is a very well-known tool.
people on the spectrum, on the autism spectrum,
might have to do a little bit of post-production tuning on their circuits.
They're not so optimized because it's just they have more neurons
than what evolution was planning for.
Right. Okay.
So does this translate to a different inner experience, so to speak?
Do they have qualia that might be different from someone who's not autistic?
You know, I want to say yes.
And I think that part of that is every sort of every ASIC is going to be
every sort of highly evolved circuit is going to be very similar.
But every FPGA is going to be wired up a little bit differently.
And so you're going to get a lot more diversity in sort of the solutions
that the brain finds.
Oh, okay.
So I guess this would like, I don't particularly make autism a part of my identity
or not part of my identity.
It's just the word.
But I do think that like this, I sometimes interact with the community
and there's this focus on neurodivergence.
And I think that's interesting because it's like everyone with autism is going to be,
you know,
different than people without autism,
but also different from other people with autism.
It's like if you have a very small circuit,
there's one way to make it work.
If you have a very big circuit,
maybe there are a hundred different ways to make it work.
And maybe you found solution 57,
whereas someone else found solution 62.
And I think that that may sort of show up in sort of how sensory experiences
present to people.
Right.
So here you're talking about the phenomenology of direct sense.
So how people, when they're actually seeing something, experiencing it,
is that what you mean would vary?
Yeah.
I think that you actually get different results in phenomenology.
Okay.
And in terms of the kind of more imaginative, internal phenomenology,
so like inner imagination and inner voices, that kind of thing,
do you think use of those would vary?
Or is that like a separate question?
I think it's all linked.
So yeah, I would also
apply this to that frame as well.
So imagination often has a practice component as well. And for many people, they engage in some kind of attentional training. Meditation being a pretty good example of this, but other techniques, alexander techniques, various other things also come into play.
I'm aware that you are a meditator. Am I correct on this?
Yeah, that's right.
Do you think that your meditation practices lead to different inner experiences, whether it regards to like your imagination or how you experience qualia differently?
Yeah, I would say so. If I had to say some words on that, I do think that just practice looking at things makes them more clear.
And I would also say that just like you mentioned alexander technique.
And I guess,
especially lately after my latest piece on vessel computation, I've been sort of practicing this.
There's this phrase, opening the hand of thought.
And I think that practicing that is a very powerful move.
And often there are clenches and clamps in our phenomenology and just sort of practicing, okay, like, what would it be so bad?
Would anything bad happen?
Would it be so bad if I just sort of released and just tried to be an open experience?
And I think that's very powerful.
Yeah. Opening the hand of thought.
I really like that phrase.
You mentioned vasocomputation, which is something that I've seen you written about.
Can you tell us more about what vasocomputation is and how that relates to TANA, which you mentioned quite a lot in your blog post?
Sure. Yeah.
Well, I'm a bit afraid that I'm kind of throwing listeners into the deep end here.
That's okay. We'll unpack it once we're done.
Nice. Nice. Good.
So I wrote this piece called Principles of Vasocomputation.
And it's basically a unification of three or four domains.
And the first domain is Buddhist phenomenology.
And especially this term that the Buddhists call TANHA.
And this is often translated as grasping or thirst.
Or clenching or desire.
And according to the Buddhists, it's responsible for maybe 90% of all sort of moment by moment.
And so it's kind of, it's a big deal.
It's important.
Just to make it clear what you mean by TANHA.
When you experience it yourself, can you describe how that comes to you?
Do you get like, is it like a verbal thought or do you see things?
Or is it just the experience of having TANHA?
Yeah. So there's, I would call it a contraction in awareness.
And there's both the general contraction and a contraction around a specific part of awareness.
And you can kind of gauge how flat your phenomenology is in a way.
And when TANHA is going,
your phenomenology feels more lumpy, I guess I would say, for lack of a better word.
Cool. Okay.
So how does TANHA relate to this thing called free energy and active inference?
And can you help unpack those terms and what they mean?
Sure, sure.
So principles of vessel computation connects three domains.
And one is Buddhist phenomenology.
And the second domain is TANHA.
And the third domain is the active inference framework.
Or the more full mouthful there would be the free energy principle active inference framework.
And so this was developed by Fristen and others.
And it's basically a framework how the brain is a prediction machine.
And we sort of hallucinate our reality.
We're always trying to predict our sensations.
And we live in that story, we can say.
And active inference is another layer on top of this that says,
not only do we make these predictions all the time,
not only do we try to predict our sensations,
but sometimes we predict false sensations and we hold these predictions until we act in the world to make them true.
So this is a very subtle, important thing, I think.
That, for example,
you know, if I'm thirsty, maybe I'll predict, oh, I'm not thirsty.
I have the taste of water in my mouth and down my throat.
Of course, that's not true.
That's a false prediction, but I'll hold it in my mind until I go, I pour myself a glass of water and take a drink, then I can release the prediction. Or if I turn the burner on on the stove, I'll hold the prediction that I need to turn off the burner until I turn off the burner. So I sort of keep track of the state of things by active inference.
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So yeah, this is a really cool, cool framework.
Sorry, I was going to say,
so the Burnham one was super interesting.
So there you said, once you've turned it on,
you would have like in your present mind,
like a prediction that you need to turn it off
rather than predicting that it will turn off.
Yeah, there's some kind of accounting system in the brain
where, okay, you know, I know now I'm turning this on
to sort of hold this state in my brain.
And I know that I can stop holding the state
once I turn it off.
So we can sort of frame that as what I'm holding
is the prediction that I, you know, the burner is off.
Gotcha.
Right, yeah.
I have a question about this
because you say that making a prediction,
for example, that you are not thirsty
is said to be a false prediction
according to this framework.
Right.
Whereas I typically interpret my desire
to grab a glass of water to be a type of wanting.
It's a type of desire
rather than thinking of it as a false prediction,
which I hold true until it becomes true
by way of my acting in the world.
And is there a difference?
Is there a difference between like falsely predicting
and simply wanting or desiring?
Or are these like functionally the same thing?
So it's the same phenomena, same mechanism for achieving.
Yeah, that's a good question.
I would say that with it,
it of course depends on the mechanism.
And with some mechanisms,
it's implemented in such a way that they would be the same.
And in some mechanisms, it would not be.
So I guess this would be an argument
for sort of dropping down
and paying attention to implementation,
which is the third domain, of course.
Right, cool.
So can you tell us more about Buddhist conceptions of Tana
and how that works?
And how that might have influenced your development
of your framework in Veso computational theories?
Yeah, sure.
So I want to give a shout out to both Romeo Stevens
and Nick Camerata.
They've really done a lot of foundational work
on thinking about Tana, novel translations of Tana,
or like sorting through, okay, what's a good translation
and what's not.
And in first person,
exploration that, you know, can we see this?
Can we put a timeframe on, you know,
does it happen within 25 to 50 milliseconds
or a hundred milliseconds or whatnot?
So they've done really, really great work.
I think, so my focus is generally
sort of connecting these domains and saying,
okay, this Buddhist,
Tana is sort of using this active inference system
in an unskillful way,
trying to control sensations in ways that don't make sense
in some sort of like there are in programming,
we can talk about type errors, trying to, you know,
add two letters together or multiply two letters together
or something like that.
It's just like, that's not the sort of thing that we're,
the tanha as unskillful active inference frames as the brain engages in a lot of that stuff
when it tries to manipulate sensations that it's it's often unskillful in the ways that it tries to
make predictions about sensations and that in a in a moment by moment sense this happens a lot
and this really adds up to like uh a lot of un sort of submerged unpleasantness in your moment
to moment experience and that i mean the the buddhists say that and if you fix this if the
the vipassana frame is you can see this happening and once you see it you can't really unsee it
and you'll start to not do wrong things right so when you say see it what do you mean by that do
you mean like a
literal seeing um i would say that uh when you observe what the mind is doing i wouldn't say uh
it necessarily flashes into your visual
field, but I do think that everyone's going to be a little bit different in how it presents.
But I would say that I think the takeaway would be sort of a bit of a shock, like, oh, wow, I'm doing that all the time?
This feels suboptimal. And I think that progress on the path, on sort of getting better at not doing this, is sort of developing a taste for what it feels like, and a distaste for like, okay, no thanks. Like, I don't need to do that to myself.
In your blog post, you use the word stress, just in a passing part of it.
Is that potentially one of the ways that you're going to be able to do that?
Yeah, I think that maybe someone would experience this. So if you're grasping a lot, partly that might add to your stress.
Yeah, so I sort of break down the Tanha as unskillful active inference into three buckets.
The first bucket is just if you try to control your sensations or control your environment more than you have the energy to.
And, you know, we all know people that try to control their sensations.
And we can all kind of feel, okay, you know, that runs into problems.
And you just get stressed trying to control everything, and it doesn't work.
I think what the Buddhists are pointing to, though, is a little bit different.
It's that we try to apply active inference or predictions to sensations in ways that don't make sense, could never come true.
Or just are sort of bound to cause us a lot of suffering.
A couple of examples?
Yeah, so a couple simple examples would be like if a sensation is good, it's a nice, pleasant, tasty sensation.
For example, if you're eating some cake and you really like it and you make the prediction, I will have this taste in my mouth forever.
Of course, you're going to run into trouble because, okay, you're going to have this problem.
And then you're going to eat all the cake, trying to eat that taste in your mouth, and then you're going to be out of cake.
And then you're just going to be left with tension.
You can't make that prediction true.
And you don't have sort of any easy way to release that tension.
The word forever in there is very powerful because, yeah, I wouldn't have thought I feel like I want the taste forever.
But maybe there is an aspect to that of the desire of the taste.
Yeah.
So Romeo Stevens says this.
This nice frame that we try to make our sensations stable, controllable, and satisfying.
And, of course, the Buddhists would say, you know, we can never ensure any sensation stable or controllable or satisfying.
So we're sort of doomed to discomfort when we assume that.
Right.
Going back, do you...
So you mentioned before that there are three unskillful active influences.
Yeah.
And the first one was that if you try to control the environment more than you have energy to, that leads to stress.
What are the other two causes of stress or unskillful?
Yeah.
So the first is just trying to control too much.
The second was trying to control in ways that don't make sense.
For example, you know, I'll have this taste forever.
Or, you know, if you drop a drink on the floor and you make the prediction, that didn't happen.
Right.
So it's not going to make it true.
You can hold it, but it's not the appropriate prediction for the event.
And then the third bucket or category of sort of ways that we can be unskillful in using active inference is...
And I think this is really a cool, important thing.
It's context desynchronization.
Mm-hmm.
So if you're doing a very hard math problem.
And you're sort of holding, you know, using tension as medium-term memory and sort of holding a problem in your mind by sort of let's pinch here and let's hold here and so on.
And then someone knocks on the door and asks to, you know, get a cup of flour, a cup of sugar, whatever is the Xanadu scenario.
Or, you know, someone says, oh, you know, we have an emergency.
There's a fire alarm or something.
The context gets switched very rapidly.
Mm-hmm.
The tension that you're holding in your mind to remember the things in context one no longer has sense in context two.
it's just stress. It's just tension. It's just suffering. It only has meaning within the right context. And it's like the, you know, if you're working on a computer program and the memory allocation changes, then your pointers are not going to point to the right things.
And I think this actually happens a lot. And that a lot of our stress, it's sort of these fragments of tension that made sense in one context, but now we're in a new context where they don't make sense.
Okay. So what is the, that's what unskillful, active, and looks like. What does skillful management tension look like?
Right. Not using it a lot.
Which means letting go?
Just kind of, you know, a little bit, a touch here, a touch there. We still need to navigate the world. And we may need tension to do that. We may need predictions to do that. We may need active inference to do that. But don't, like, make as few as possible. And don't hold them.
So skillfully choose your predictions and then like update them more often or replace them?
Yeah, yeah. Just hold them gently.
Right.
So how does this now like lead to the next step?
to predictions?
Yeah.
And what is like the optimal level prediction or active inference to do in order to have a healthy relationship, internal states, whether it be?
Right. That's a good question.
I think that, you know, as we were saying, you know, being sparing with the predictions that understand that a prediction is a commitment to tension and a little bit of suffering until it comes true.
But you also need them to navigate the world.
Yeah.
I think that, so we were all at just camp together where we met. And Vin and I were talking about the self and, you know, the self as kind of the sum total of tension in the mind.
And I think this sort of nicely dovetails with some of the ways the Buddhists talk about the self and tension as sort of not the optimal way to navigate the world.
Um, so I guess I would just say that, uh, you know, everything is contextual.
There may not be a, you know, this is always good.
This is always bad, but there will always be a dimension of, is this skillful?
And is this not?
Can you talk about what, what good and bad mean in this concept?
I know that's like, right, right.
Um, yeah, that's, that's a hard problem.
Um, I mean, so in my more formal philosophy research, um, I study pain and pleasure.
And I'd be, I'd be hesitant to, to say, yes, you know, pleasure is always good.
Pain is always bad.
Uh, because now sometimes these sensations are trying to do things for us.
And, um, I think that, uh, I mean, good and bad could be framed in terms of the free energy
principle.
Um, and sort of, it could, you know, be framed in terms of, uh, adaptiveness to the environment
and so on.
So I'm not sure I have a, a sort of clean.
Like this is what good is.
This is what bad is, but just an appreciation.
There's, there's a lot of theories.
Yeah.
This is a lot of context.
Yeah.
That's a pretty tall order to deliver.
Um, anyway, uh, just moving on from that, I suppose, um, I really want to talk about
qualia and when you worked in a institute that had qualia in its name, and I was wondering
what you thought, um, what, what do you, what do you take qualia to?
And can you tell us more about that?
Yeah.
Um, so I always.
Uh, introduce quality as the components of subjective experience.
And it's a little bit, you know, uh, the, the easy, uh, explanation would be, you know,
there's red, there's heavy, there's, uh, hot, et cetera.
Um, but what the actual natural kinds of qualia are is a very interesting unsolved question.
Um, thanks Mike.
Yeah.
You bet.
Uh, thanks Ben.
And, uh, thanks Francis.
Thank you.
It was super interesting.
Yeah.
They're connecting to some really important things about how we experience our life every
day.
Um, but also a theory that connects them up, which is great.
Yeah.